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From a theoretical or an academic point of view, 
one can justifiably argue that the EU is in urgent 
need  of  a  strategy,  of  a  Grand  Strategy  even,  in 
particular to underpin its foreign policy. But does a 
Grand Strategy matter in the real world? Would it 
for instance provide leverage to the EU to influence 
international crisis management? Would it have an 
impact  on  EU  decisions  to  launch  or  to  refrain 
from  CSDP  operations?  Would  it  enhance  the 
chances to conduct such operations successfully? 
The Cold War 
If we analyse the European integration process, one 
could advocate that there is a merit in not having a 
(declared) strategy, certainly not a fully-fledged one 
with clear-cut objectives, well-identified means and 
ways to pursue them. The way we evolved from the 
European  Coal  and  Steal  Community  to  the  EU 
was not so much based on a strategy as on a vague 
method: la méthode Monnet. And on a single principle, 
subsidiarity,  i.e.  we  transfer  a  policy  from  the 
national to the European level, belatedly, when it is 
really  no  longer  affordable  nor  doable  at  the 
national level. And it worked. But only because of 
specific geopolitical circumstances. We could afford 
at the time to be more inward-looking.  
Indeed,  by  rejecting  the  idea  of  establishing  a 
European  Defence  Community,  developing  a 
security and defence policy within the framework of 
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European integration remained a taboo subject for 
about  four  decades.  But  this  restriction  did  not 
harm us – West-Europeans – too much at the time. 
During the Cold War, we were living in an a-typical 
period  of  history,  characterised  by  frozen 
international relations, with the US taking care of 
security problems for all Allies and partners. Before 
that  period,  and  certainly  nowadays,  the  only 
constant  element  in  international  relations  is 
“ongoing change”. Looking in the rear mirror, the 
absence of a too clearly declared strategy and the 
internal  focus  on  economic  integration  had  its 
merits, but at present it is no longer fit for purpose.  
The  Need  for  Europeans  to  Engage  in 
Crisis Management  
Pretty soon after the fall of the Berlin wall, the EU 
as  such  was  tested  by  the  crisis  that  erupted  in 
Yugoslavia.  Jacques  Poos,  the  then  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  Luxembourg,  holding  the  EU 
Presidency,  said  :  “C’est  l’heure  de  l’Europe”.  But 
Europe failed. One of the lessons learned was that a 
European Security and Defence  Policy was to be 
added  to  the  European  construction.  But  when 
introduced back in 1999, the ESDP was more an 
instrument than a  policy, because talking about a 
strategy  on  when  and  where  to  launch  ESDP 
operations still remained taboo.  
During the Belgian Presidency, in the second half 
of 2001, it was proposed to publish an EU White 
Book on Defence. The reactions from the then 15 
Member States showed that there are more than a 
dozen ways to gently say “no” to any reference to 
strategy in such a publication... 
Not that much later, a second international crisis, in 
Iraq, inspired  many  wise men and women in the 
Convention  to  propose  important  additional 
building-blocks  allowing  the  EU  to  develop  a 
genuine  strategy.  Fortunately,  the  revolutionary 
ideas  put  forward  in  the  Working  Groups  on 
External  relations  and  on  Defence  survived  the 
Convention,  went  unchanged  into  the  draft 
Constitution  and  later  into  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon. 
Building-blocks, but still no strategy.     
In  2003  the  EU  published  its  European  Security 
Strategy.  A  daring  document  at  the  time.  But  it 
mainly  has  merit  if  seen  as  a  step  leading  to 
something bigger. The ESS is indeed but an aperitif 
to a strategy, giving some indications on “how” to 
manage  crisis  management  operations,  while 
remaining  rather  silent  on  “why”  and  “when”  to 
launch operations. Moreover, no indication is given 
of the capabilities required for crisis management. 
On the other hand, the question “where” to operate 
got  an  answer:  worldwide.  However,  and  to  no 
surprise, it is fair to say that the impact of the ESS 
on the actual ESDP operations launched since its 
adoption has been minimal. 
The  series  of  military,  civil-military  and  civilian 
ESDP operations launched by the EU so far was 
never the result of any strategy. Most of the time 
the EU simply reacted to an opportunity to be of 
help, without having longer term perspectives. For 
instance,  to  the  UN  request  to  reinforce  the 
MONUC in Congo, the answer was “yes” in 2003 
(Operation  Artemis  in  Eastern  Congo),  “yes”  in 
2006 (EUFOR RDC  during the electoral period), 
but “no” at the end of 2008, when requested once 
more to assist in Eastern Congo.  
Needless to say that even today in the eyes of many 
the  EU  is  all  but  influential  on  the  international 
scene, in particular in the area of crisis management.  
On the Ground  
Does it do harm not to have a Grand Strategy wile 
conducting a specific crisis management operation? 
It does.  
In  crisis  management  operations  the  chances  for 
success  cannot  be  measured  by  adding  up  all  the 
instruments deployed. It rather is a multiplication: if 
one factor is zero, the result is zero. One may have 
all the required military capabilities, but if there is 
shortage on the civilian side, the net result will be 
suboptimal.  But  the  most  important  factor  is  to 
have  a  comprehensive  political  strategy,  a  clear  desired 
political  end-state,  and  a  clear  and  precise  political 
roadmap to achieve all this. And, most important, in 
order to achieve a durable solution, a clear regional 
and even a global political consensus on the long 
term objectives is required. In the absence of such a 
comprehensive  political  strategy  –  an  other  word 
for a grand strategy – the military can, at an initial 
stage, be part of the solution but over time will end 
up  being  part  of  the  problem.  Without  an  
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overarching political strategy, the net result of any 
crisis  management  will  be  close  to  zero,  if  not 
negative: a lesson that in the mean time is known to 
all of us. 
The Lisbon Era  
It is encouraging to note that the Lisbon Treaty not 
only  explicitly  calls  for  identifying  “the  strategic 
interests  and  objectives  of  the  Union”,1  it  also 
provides us with all the basic elements required to 
arrive at a comprehensive political strategy. Indeed, 
for a Grand Strategy,  one must first  define the 
values considered vital or essential  for the kind of 
society  one  seeks  to preserve.  And that part of 
strategy is clearly mentioned in the Treaty.2   
The only reaming question is whether the political 
appetite exists  in  the  EU  and, more importantly, 
among  the  Member  States  to  put  the  puzzle 
together and to act accordingly.  
Favourable Political Conditions  
The time is now particularly favourable to develop 
an EU Grand Strategy, for two good reasons. 
First,  Member  States  no  longer  see  the 
development  of  an  EU  strategy  as  counter-
productive,  as  the  shortest  way  to  splitting 
Members  States  and  splitting  NATO.  Already 
during  the  second  Bush  Administration  and  now 
even  more,  with  the  Obama  Administration,  the 
transatlantic  dialogue,  in  particular  the  dialogue 
between the EU and Washington, has changed. A 
kind of “common European Strategic attitude” is 
now expected by the US.  
Secondly, soon we will finalise the process leading 
towards a new Strategic Concept for NATO. This 
process will force EU Member States to think about 
the  future  of  NATO,  about  the  future  of 
Transatlantic  relations  –  and  thus  about  EU-US 
relations  and  subsequently  EU-  NATO  relations. 
                                                            
1 Art. 22 §1: “On the basis of the principles and objectives set 
out  in  Article 21,  the  European  Council  shall  identify  the 
strategic interests and objectives of the Union. Decisions of the 
European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the 
Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and 
to other areas of the external action of the Union.”  
2 See i.a. Preambule, Art. 21, and the  Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU. 
Once we will have consensus on all these matters 
across the Atlantic, the political climate to develop a 
“European Grand Strategy” will be more relaxed. 
(One  could  even  argue  it  will  require  a  “Stealth 
European Strategy” to have a constructive debate 
on a new Strategic Concept for NATO).  
Will it Happen?  
The climate may be favourable, but that does not 
guarantee that it will happen. Here history can shed 
some  light.  As  Paul-Henri  Spaak,  a  former 
Secretary-General  of  NATO  and  former  Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, said some 60 years ago, 
there are two kinds of countries in Europe – small 
countries, and countries that have yet to realize that 
they are small countries. In Saint-Malo, where they 
launched  ESDP,  the  UK  and  France  were  well 
aware of being too small to  set up – or even to 
influence  –  crisis  management  operations  by 
themselves,  like  the  one  needed  for  Yugoslavia. 
They agreed this requires at the minimum an EU 
approach.  
Since  then  a  lot  has  happened.  We  now  have 
continents that know they are small and continents 
that are discovering that they are small. But of these 
continents,  those  that  have  a  Grand  Strategy  are 
playing  chess,  while  the  EU,  without  a  Grand 
Strategy, is playing Ping Pong. Guess who has to 
change its game? 
This leads to the conclusion that the political will to 
shape an EU that acts more strategically is growing 
by  the  day.  Soon  instruments  like  the  External 
Action  Service  will  be  operational,  ready  to 
underpin and to follow up  EU political decision-
making  on  international  strategy  and  policies.  La 
méthode Monnet will guide us once more. One could 
argue that in doing so the EU is again a bit late, is 
not in pace with an outside world that is changing 
rapidly. However, it is important to have policies 
and  decisions  based  on  a  broad  consensus,  to 
remain  in  pace  with  the  political  will  expressed 
throughout  the  EU.  Fortunately,  from 
Eurobarometer polls it is clear that public opinion 
in  about  all  Member  States  has  been  strongly  in 
favour of developing a genuine CSDP for years. It 
is encouraging to note that in these matters public 
opinion  is  ahead  of  policy-makers.  Time  for  the 
latter to catch up. After all, by providing the EU  
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with a Grand Strategy we are but living up to the 
political decisions that led to the Lisbon Treaty and 
are but giving substance to the European Security 
Strategy.  
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